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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Elizabeth Lake is mentally retarded. In 1977, at 16 years 
of age, she was permanently sterilized. She and her 
husband, Justin, ask in this appeal whether they can still 
challenge the sterilization under state and federal law by 
bringing claims against her father and step-mother who 
authorized the operation, against the doctors who 
performed it, and against the hospital where it was 
 
                                2 
  
performed. Although we agree with the District Court's 
decision that the Lakes' state claims are time-barred by 
Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations for personal 
injury suits, we do not agree with its conclusion that the 
federal civil rights claims are also untimely. Given our 
earlier decision that the mentally retar ded are a protected 
class for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. S 1985(3), we must 
determine whether federal tolling doctrine will permit 
Elizabeth Lake to escape the bar of the statute of 
limitations on her federal claims. For the r easons we 
explain below, we will remand this case to the District 
Court to make this determination in further pr oceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
In addition to affirming the dismissal of Elizabeth's state 
personal injury claims, we also affirm the District Court's 
dismissal of Justin's state law loss of consortium claim. 
Finally, we affirm the District Court's denial of the Lakes' 




Plaintiff-appellant Elizabeth Arnold Lake was born in 
Ventura, California, in 1961 to Helga Hadvig and Frederick 
Arnold. Until she was twelve, Elizabeth lived with her 
mother and her mother's boyfriend in Minnesota. Her father 
then invited her to move to Saxton, Pennsylvania, to live 
with him and his wife, Audrey Arnold. Elizabeth accepted 
the offer. Elizabeth attended special education classes 
through the eighth grade, which she completed at age 16 
when she left school. 
 
That same year, in June 1977, Elizabeth underwent a 
tubal ligation at Tyrone Hospital, in Tyr one, Pennsylvania. 
The Lakes allege that the hospital had a policy allowing the 
sterilization of the mentally retarded. They contend that on 
the advice of the family physician, Dr. Chester Isenberg, 
Elizabeth was taken to the hospital by her father and step- 
mother. Despite the fact that Elizabeth was mentally 
retarded and allegedly illiterate, hospital employees gave 
her a consent form to sign, authorizing the pr ocedure. 
Elizabeth signed the form. Dr. Daniel Friday, supervised by 
Dr. Ralph Crawford, perfor med the surgery. At no point did 
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any of the defendants seek to have Elizabeth's inter ests, as 
opposed to her parents' interests, r eviewed by a court or 
other appropriate forum. 
 
The Lakes claim that after the surgery Elizabeth's father 
and step-mother removed her from school and had her do 
housekeeping duties in their home. She remained a 
member of the Arnold household until she was in her 
twenties, when she moved into a group home. 
 
In May 1993, Justin and Elizabeth decided to get 
married. In December 1993, at Justin's behest, Elizabeth 
visited a gynecologist to discuss the couple's desir e to start 
a family. During this visit, the doctor told Elizabeth that 
she could not bear children because of her 1977 tubal 
ligation. Allegedly, this visit to the doctor was the first time 
that Elizabeth learned that her 1977 sur gery had left her 
permanently sterilized. Justin and Elizabeth were married 
in 1994. 
 
II. Procedural History 
 
The Lakes first filed this civil action on May 31, 1995, in 
Pennsylvania state court against the following defendants: 
(1) Elizabeth's father, Frederick S. Ar nold, (2) her 
stepmother, Audrey L. Arnold, (3) Dr. Daniel M. Friday, (4) 
Dr. Ralph W. Crawford, and (5) Tyrone Hospital. The action 
alleged nine counts, including state claims for civil battery, 
negligence, lack of informed consent, and outrageous 
conduct, as well as two federal counts, one under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983 for violation under color of state law of Elizabeth's 
constitutional right to procreate and the other under 42 
U.S.C. S 1985(3) for conspiracy to deprive Elizabeth of the 
right to procreate because she was mentally retarded. 
Justin also filed a claim of loss of consortium based on 
Elizabeth's infertility. 
 
Tyrone Hospital successfully petitioned to r emove the 
case to federal court. Following removal, the plaintiffs filed 
an amended complaint. All the defendants then filed 
motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pr o. 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim. Adopting the Magistrate Judge's 
Report and Recommendation, the District Court in June 
1996 dismissed the two federal civil rights claims, 
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remanded the remaining state claims to the state court, 
and relinquished jurisdiction. 
 
Elizabeth and Justin appealed this decision. On May 2, 
1997, we reversed the District Court's decision to dismiss 
the federal civil rights claims, concluding that (1) the Lakes 
had alleged sufficient facts to sustain a claim of state action 
under S 19832 and (2) the mentally disabled were a 
protected class for the purposes of a S 1985(3) conspiracy 
claim. See Lake v. Arnold, 112 F .3d 682 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(Lake I). We remanded the case to the District Court for 
further proceedings. 
 
On remand, in response to the amended complaint that 
reasserted the Lakes' state and federal claims, the 
defendants again moved to dismiss, this time contending 
that the Lakes' claims were time-barred by the relevant 
Pennsylvania statute of limitations. The Magistrate Judge 
once again ruled for the defendants, recommending in his 
Report and Recommendation that Elizabeth's claims be 
dismissed as time-barred and that Justin's loss of 
consortium claim be dismissed on substantive gr ounds. See 
Lake v. Arnold, No. 95-245J (W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 1998) (Lake 
II). Both parties filed timely objections. The Lakes also 
requested leave to amend their complaint to allege new, but 
unspecified, facts. The District Court, however , adopted the 
Magistrate Judge's recommendations on the statute of 
limitations and on Justin's loss of consortium claim and 
denied the Lakes' request for leave to amend their 
complaint. See Lake v. Arnold, No. 95-245J (W.D. Pa. Oct. 
30, 1998) (Lake III).3 It is this order that the Lakes now 
appeal. 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the Lakes' federal civil rights claims under 28 U.S.C. S 1331 
and supplemental jurisdiction over their related state 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We found that the Lakes' allegations that Tyrone Hospital was a state 
actor were adequate to withstand a motion to dismiss. 
 
3. The Magistrate Judge also dismissed Dr . Crawford's defense that he 
was not Dr. Friday's supervisor and Audr ey Arnold's defense that she 
owed Elizabeth no legal duty of protection. See Lake III, slip op. at 3-4 
nn. 3-4. Neither party, however, appeals these decisions and we do not 
address them. 
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claims under 28 U.S.C. S 1367. We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
III. Statute of Limitations 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 
We exercise plenary review of the District Court's 
dismissal of the Lakes' claims on statute of limitations 
grounds under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Algrant v. 
Evergreen Valley Nurseries Ltd. Partnership, 126 F.3d 178, 
181 (3d Cir. 1997). This plenary review extends to the 
District Court's choice and interpretation of applicable 
tolling principles and its conclusion that the facts 
prevented a tolling of the statute of limitations. See Sheet 
Metal Workers Local 19 v. 2300 Group, Inc., 949 F.2d 1274, 
1278 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Venau's v. Vic's Meat Market, 
Inc., 896 F.2d 43, 45 (3d Cir. 1990)). We assume, for the 
purposes of our review, that all the facts the Lakes allege in 
their complaint are true and we give them, as the 
nonmoving parties below, the benefit of all r easonable 
inferences one can draw from these facts. We review the 
District Court's determinations of state law de novo. See 
Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991); 
Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1012 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 
B. Applicable Statute of Limitations 
 
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's 
recommendation that Pennsylvania's two-year statute of 
limitations for personal injury lawsuits gover ned both the 
Lakes' state and federal claims. See Lake III . While we agree 
that Pennsylvania law bars Elizabeth's state law claims, we 
do not agree with the District Court's deter mination that 
the federal claims are also time-barred. Although the 
Pennsylvania statute of limitations is applied to the federal 
claims, federal tolling doctrine may be applicable to 
determine whether Elizabeth's federal claims are timely. See 
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman , 38 F.3d 1380, 
1387 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying federal tolling to limitations 
period in employment discrimination case); Heck v. 
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Humphrey, 997 F.2d 355, 357-58 (7th Cir. 1993). As we 
discuss below, application of the federal tolling doctrine 
leads us to conclude that the federal claims may not be 
barred. 
 
1. State Personal Injury Claims 
 
Elizabeth's state claims run the gamut of personal injury 
claims common to medical malpractice suits, alleging (1) 
civil battery, (2) negligence by Elizabeth's par ents, the 
doctors, and the hospital, (3) lack of infor med consent, and 
(4) outrageous conduct by her parents, the doctors and the 
hospital. The District Court, adopting the Magistrate 
Judge's recommendation, dismissed them all as time 
barred by Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations for 
personal injury suits. See 42 Pa. C.S. S 5524 (West 1999).4 
 
The statute of limitations begins to run "fr om the time 
the cause of action accrued," which we have pr eviously 
interpreted to mean when "the first significant event 
necessary to make the claim suable" occurs. Ross v. Johns- 
Mansville Corp., 766 F.2d 823, 826 (3d Cir. 1985); see 
generally 42 Pa. C.S. S 5502(a) (W est 1999). Thus, 
Elizabeth's claim under state law accrued in 1977, when 
she was sterilized. Although theoretically Elizabeth could 
have brought her claim in 1977, she contends that as a 
practical matter she could not have done so because she 
was 16 years old and mentally retarded. If a claim were to 
have been brought on her behalf at that time, it would have 
been brought by her guardians, her father and step-mother, 
see, e.g., Walker v. Mummert , 146 A.2d 289, 291 (Pa. 1958), 
but it was the guardians who in fact arranged for the 
sterilization to be performed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The statutory language reads in pertinent part: 
 
       The following actions and proceedings must be commenced within 
       two years:  . . . 
 
       (2) An action to recover damages for injuries to the person or 
       for the death of an individual caused by the wr ongful act or 
       neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another. 
 
       . . . 
 
42 Pa. C.S. 5524 (West 1999). 
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Under the two-year limitations period, Elizabeth's cause 
of action expired in 1979, two years after her operation. At 
the time of Elizabeth's sterilization, the statute of 
limitations did not toll for either minority or incompetence. 
See Walter v. Ditzler, 227 A.2d 833 (Pa. 1967). Although the 
statute was later amended in 1984 to toll for minors until 
they reached age 18, that amendment was not r etroactive. 
See Maycock v. Gravely Corp., 508 A.2d 330 (Pa. 1986). 
Even if it were retroactive, however , Elizabeth's claim would 
have expired in 1986, making her 1993 claims still 
untimely. Moreover, the statute of limitations was never 
amended to include incompetency as grounds for tolling. 
See 42 Pa. C.S. S 5533 (West 1999). 5 Thus, Elizabeth's 
mental retardation is not a basis for pr eserving her claim 
under Pennsylvania's tolling statute.6  
 
Pennsylvania common law does, however, allow some 
"breathing room," as the Magistrate Judge's report 
recognized, in that it recognizes the discovery rule, which 
tolls the statute of limitations until a plaintif f actually 
discovers the harm caused by an earlier inflicted but latent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The statutory language reads: 
 
       (a) General rule.--Except as otherwise provided by statute, 
insanity 
       or imprisonment does not extend the time limited by this 
       subchapter for the commencement of a matter. 
 
       (b) Infancy.--If an individual entitled to bring a civil action is 
an 
       unemancipated minor at the time the cause of action accrues, the 
       period of minority shall not be deemed a portion of the time period 
       within which the action must be commenced. Such person shall 
       have the same time for commencing an action after attaining 
       majority as is allowed to others by the provisions of this 
subchapter. 
       As used in this subsection the term "minor" shall mean any 
       individual who has not yet attained the age of 18. 
 
42 Pa. C.S. S 5533 (West 1999). 
 
6. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court justified its strict construction of the 
personal injury statute of limitations in regar d to the mentally 
incompetent in its opinion in Walker v. Mummert, 146 A.2d 289, 291 (Pa. 
1958), in which the court emphasized that the practice of appointing a 
guardian, who can bring suit on behalf of the incompetent, would 
mitigate against any harsh consequences from a strict construction of 
the statute of limitations against the incompetent. 
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injury. See Ayers v. Morgan, 154 A.2d 788 (Pa. 1959) 
(permitting statute of limitations to toll for plaintiff's 
injuries that later developed from doctor leaving a sponge in 
his abdomen during surgery). 
 
Nevertheless, the discovery rule does not af fect 
Elizabeth's state claims because the circumstances under 
which it can be invoked depend on the nature of the injury 
rather than any specific characteristics unique to the 
plaintiff that might otherwise prevent her from recognizing 
her injury as a cause of action; such unique characteristics 
include one's mental state. See, e.g. , Dalrymple v. Brown, 
701 A.2d 164 (Pa. 1997) (denying discovery rule for 
repressed memory syndrome); Molineux v. Reed, 532 A.2d 
792 (Pa. 1987) (permitting defendants to assert limitations 
defense because plaintiff had no evidence of fraudulent 
concealment). This objective standard pr events Elizabeth 
from pursuing her claim. Her injury was not latent; 
therefore, it was not the latent natur e of the injury that 
prevented her from knowing of it. It was her mental 
retardation and her illiteracy that wer e the causes for her 
failing to discover her injury. These characteristics are 
particular to Elizabeth and do not depend on the type of 
injury she suffered. 
 
The Lakes now argue, however, that it might be possible 
for Elizabeth to meet the discovery rule's r easonableness 
standard, regardless of her mental r etardation and 
illiteracy. However, the Lakes have alleged in this action 
that Elizabeth could not understand the natur e and scope 
of the operation. In light of this repr esentation of her 
inability to appreciate the nature and scope of sterilization 
surgery as a reasonable person would, we must conclude 
that Elizabeth could not meet the reasonableness standard. 
Moreover, because Pennsylvania law r equires a plaintiff to 
exercise a reasonable amount of diligence and vigilance 
when pursuing a claim, see Redenz v. Rosenber g, 520 A.2d 
883, 886 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), Elizabeth's invocation of the 
discovery rule is further undermined by the fact that she 
took no steps to inquire into the natur e of her operation 
until almost two decades after it was perfor med. In 
addition, in determining diligence, we would again evaluate 
the adequacy of the inquiry by the reasonable person 
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standard, not by the standard of the mentally retarded and 
illiterate. 
 
There is one other circumstance under which a plaintiff 
can escape the rigors of Pennsylvania's statute of 
 949<!>limitations: when the defendants have intentionally 
 
misinformed the plaintiff or concealed information from her 
so that they are estopped from invoking the statute of 
limitations. See Walters v. Ditzler, 227 A.2d 833 (Pa. 1967). 
As we noted above, however, the Lakes do not allege that 
the defendants intentionally misinformed Elizabeth about 
her sterilization. 
 
Finally, we are unwilling to accept the Lakes' argument 
that we should distinguish existing Pennsylvania pr ecedent 
that prohibits relying on subjective mental characteristics 
to invoke the discovery rule on the "permanent" or 
"biological" nature of Elizabeth's mental state. As the 
defendants correctly point out, these ar e medical rather 
than legal distinctions. As such, they cannot serve as a 
basis for reinterpreting what seems to be clearly stated 
Pennsylvania law: mental incompetency does not toll the 
personal injury statute of limitations. 
 
In sum, under the Pennsylvania statute of limitations, 
Elizabeth had two years from the date of her operation to 
bring her state law personal injury claims. Neither the state 
statutory tolling provisions, which do not authorize tolling 
for mental incompetency, nor the state discovery rule, 
which applies an objective standard for deter mining when 
an individual should discover a latent injury, af ford 
Elizabeth any relief from the conclusion that her state 
claims are time-barred by Pennsylvania's two-year statute 
of limitations. While this conclusion appears harsh, under 
principles of federalism and comity between state and 
federal courts, we must respect the state's decision to 
determine the appropriate policies, including the statute of 
limitations and their related tolling pr ovisions, for its own 
judicial procedures. 
 
2. Federal Causes of Action Under Sections 1983 and 
1985 
 
The Lakes also assert that the defendants' r ole in 
permanently sterilizing Elizabeth gives rise to two federal 
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causes of action for violating her substantive due process 
right to procreate. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942). Because neither S 1983 nor S 1985(3) contains a 
statute of limitations, we must rely on 42 U.S.C. S 1988, 
which guides our selection of the appropriate time period to 
fill the gap. Section 1988 requires us to use the statute of 
limitations for the state where the federal court sits unless 
its application would conflict with the Constitution or with 
federal law.7 
 
In determining which state limitations period to use in 
federal civil rights cases, we look to the general, residual 
statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Wilson 
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1985). W e must also 
incorporate any relevant state tolling rules. See Hardin v. 
Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1989). Thus, forS 1983 and 
S 1985 actions originating in Pennsylvania, we look to 42 
Pa. C.S. SS 5524 and 5533. See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 
331, 347 (3d Cir. 1989) (S 1983); Bougher v. University of 
Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir . 1989) (S 1985). 
 
As we recognized in analyzing Elizabeth's state claims in 
Part III.B.1, Pennsylvania's statute of limitations requires 
all personal injury claims to be brought within a two-year 
time period and is not tolled for mental incompetence. 
Because Elizabeth's sterilization occurred well outside this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Title 42 U.S.C. S 1988 provides, in relevant part: 
 
       The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the 
       district courts by the provisions of this T itle, and of Title 
"CIVIL 
       RIGHTS," and of Title "CRIMES," for the protection of all persons 
in 
       the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, 
shall 
       be exercised and enforced in confor mity with the laws of the 
United 
       States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry same into effect; 
       but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are 
       deficient in the provisions necessary to fur nish suitable remedies 
       and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and 
       changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the 
       court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal causes is held, 
so 
       far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws 
of 
       the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts 
       in the trial and disposition of the cause. 
 
(emphasis added). 
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time frame, any injury she suffered would appear to be 
barred as untimely. This conclusion, however , is premature. 
We must first determine whether the state's tolling 
provisions themselves conflict with federal law and policy, 
a question that is not squarely governed by Wilson and 
Hardin. 
 
Wilson "principally involves the second step in the 
process [of applying S 1988]: the selection of `the most 
appropriate' or `the most analogous' state statute of 
limitations to apply" to S 1983 claims. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 
268. The policies that motivated Wilson, i.e., uniformity, 
certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation, 
do not frame our analysis because we are instead 
concerned with S 1988's third pr ong: whether the state 
limitations statute conflicts with federal law and policy. See 
Hardin, 490 U.S. at 544 n.14 (concluding that Wilson's 
policies are "more pertinent to deter mine which state laws 
are appropriate than whether application of those laws 
fosters the policies of S 1983."). Similarly, although Hardin 
analyzed whether tolling statutes in general conflicted with 
S 1983's policies of compensation and deterr ence, it did not 
hold that courts should ignore whether a state's particular 
tolling provision itself conflicts with federal law and policy. 
We must still, then, decide whether Pennsylvania's tolling 
rule satisfies this inquiry. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 
446 U.S. 478, 486 (1980) (requiring deter mination of 
whether the New York tolling rule contradicted federal law). 
 
As a policy matter, SS 1983 and 1985(3) are designed to 
compensate victims whose federal constitutional or 
statutory civil rights have been violated and to pr event 
future abuses of state power. See Burnett v. Grattan, 468 
U.S. 42, 53 (1984). As such, these remedial statutes strive 
to give victims the opportunity to sue for r elief. See id. at 
55. In contrast, state statutes of limitations ar e not crafted 
to promote federal remedial policies. See Occidental Life Ins. 
Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) (noting that "[s]tate 
legislatures do not devise their limitations period with 
national interests in mind"). This disconnect means that, 
occasionally, the state statute of limitations must be 
modified to promote the federal inter ests at bar. 
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With this background in mind, let us look carefully at the 
federal claims that Elizabeth is asserting. W e held in Lake 
I that the mentally retarded, as a class, are entitled to 
protection under civil rights laws such asS 1985(3) because 
 
       [t]he fact that a person bears no responsibility for a 
       handicap, combined with the pervasive discrimination 
       practiced against the mentally retarded and the 
       emerging rejection of this discrimination as 
       incompatible with our ideals of equality convinces us 
       that whatever the outer boundaries of the concept, an 
       animus directed against the mentally retar ded includes 
       the elements of a class-based invidiously 
       discriminatory motivation. 
 
112 F.3d at 688 (quoting Novotny v. Gr eat Am. Fed. Sav. 
and Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1243 (3d Cir. 1978)) 
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). As we also 
pointed out, involuntary sterilization is one manifestation of 
this discrimination against the mentally incompetent. See 
id. at 688 (citing law review articles). Elizabeth's federal 
claims are based on the violation of her constitutional right 
to procreate. Consequently, her claims ar e the type that 
S 1985(3) and S 1983 are designed to protect. 
 
Moreover, under the federal policy that the mentally 
retarded are a protected class, Elizabeth should not be 
denied her right to sue solely because of her mental 
retardation. In Elizabeth's case, her mental incompetency 
was the reason her guardians, who ought to have protected 
her, sought to sterilize her and the r eason that the hospital 
performed the operation. Not allowing any tolling, even in 
an extraordinary situation such as this one, puts 
Pennsylvania's statute of limitations at odds with the 
objectives that S 1983 and S 1985(3) foster by barring an 
individual, especially a member of a protected class, who 
was deprived, as in this case, of her ability to bring a claim 
through her guardians, from seeking compensation and 
deterrence.8 Consequently, the rigidity of the Pennsylvania 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In Elizabeth's case, deterrence is of less concern because Pennsylvania 
now requires a court proceeding befor e guardians can consent to their 
ward's sterilization. See 20 Pa. C.S. A. S 5221(d)(1). See also In re 
Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376 (Pa. Super . Ct. 1982) (holding sterilization 
by 
guardian's consent requires court or der). 
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statute of limitations in regard to mental incompetence, 
absent a guardian who will protect rather than jeopardize 
those rights, directly conflicts with Elizabeth's right as a 
mentally retarded person to remedy a violation of her 
constitutionally protected rights. We ar e thus not obligated 
to apply that state rule. 
 
When the state tolling rules contradict federal law or 
policy, in certain limited circumstances we can turn to 
federal tolling doctrine. See Heck v. Humphr ey, 997 F.2d 
355, 358 (7th Cir. 1993) (recognizing equitable tolling 
applicable to S 1983 actions where state limitations 
provision conflicts with federal policy); Boos v. Runyon, 201 
F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 1999) (r ecognizing that tolling for a 
person's mental disability is "highly case-specific" but 
declining to apply in instant case); Grant v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 163 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(permitting federal equitable tolling of a state limitations 
period for federal claims in exceptional cir cumstances but 
finding none present); Nunnally v. MacCausland, 996 F.2d 
1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1993) (remanding for factual determination 
as to whether alleged mental illness justified equitable 
tolling). Federal courts may toll statutes of limitations for 
federal laws where the plaintiff "in some extraordinary way 
has been prevented from asserting his or her rights." 
Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(citing Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Ber man, 38 
F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also Bowen v. City of 
New York, 476 U.S. 467, 480 (1986) (authorizing equitable 
tolling where consistent with congressional intent).9 The 
doctrine prevents a party from profiting from its own 
wrongdoing. See Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1388. 
 
Equitable tolling stops the statute of limitations from 
running when the date on which the claim accrued has 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Equitable tolling is appropriate in thr ee general scenarios: (1) where 
a 
defendant actively misleads a plaintiff with r espect to her cause of 
action; (2) where the plaintiff has been prevented from asserting her 
claim as a result of other extraordinary circumstances; or (3) where the 
plaintiff asserts her claims in a timely manner but has done so in the 
wrong forum. See Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1387. We are concerned in this 
case with only the second scenario, where extraordinary circumstances 
prevent a plaintiff from timelyfiling. 
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already passed. See id. Equitable tolling can be applied to 
suits brought under the federal civil rights statutes when 
the state statute of limitations would otherwise frustrate 
federal policy, see, e.g., Heck , 997 F.2d at 358, because as 
Wilson recognized, the "adopted" state rule operates "as a 
federal rule responsive to the need whenever a federal right 
is impaired." Wilson, 471 U.S. at 269. When a plaintiff 
requests federal equitable tolling but the facts underlying 
that request are disputed or unclear , a court may remand 
the case to determine if the facts actually support tolling. 
See Nunnally, 996 F.2d at 5-7. If Elizabeth's allegations 
prove on remand to be true, we conclude that in this 
situation, where a guardian conspir es to deprive a mentally 
incompetent person of her constitutional and civil rights, 
equitable tolling might be appropriate. Elizabeth would then 
be entitled to revive the two-year period that the 
Pennsylvania law provides for her to bring her claim. See 
Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1389. 
 
We are not, in remanding this case to the District Court, 
holding that a mentally incompetent plaintif f would never 
be bound by state statute of limitations provisions in 
federal civil rights actions or, alter natively, that she would 
be evaluated by a more lenient subjective test. Cf. Robinson, 
107 F.3d at 1022-23 (recognizing that a liberal 
interpretation of equitable tolling exception would swallow 
the rule). In fact, we have previously held that mental 
incompetence is not per se a reason to toll the statute of 
limitations in federal actions. See e.g., Barr en by Barren v. 
United States, 839 F.2d 987 (3d Cir . 1988) (rejecting mental 
incompetence as reason to toll statute of limitations under 
Federal Tort Claims Act). Where we have permitted 
equitable tolling for mental disability in the past, the 
plaintiff's mental incompetence motivated, to some degree, 
the injury that he sought to remedy. See Eubanks v. 
Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa 1977) (deciding to 
equitably toll the Pennsylvania statute of limitations for a 
mentally incompetent plaintiff who was involuntarily 
committed for entire limitations period).10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The Eubanks court concluded that it was unreasonable to expect a 
mental ward inmate to pursue his claims and thus, denying him his 
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The unique facts of Elizabeth's claim distinguish her case 
from others where a plaintiff has ar gued for tolling based 
on mental incapacity. Generally, under a state law where 
there is no equitable tolling for mental incapacity, the 
guardian is expected to protect the war d's interests. 
Pennsylvania does not permit tolling for mental 
incompetency for this very reason: 
 
       [T]he established procedures for the appointment of 
       guardians afford sufficient pr otection to individuals 
       who are non compos mentis that their claims will be 
       instituted within the permissible period and thereby 
       diminishes the risk that the rights of incompetents will 
       be impaired by our holding that their disability does 
       not toll the running of the statute of limitations 
       applicable to actions for personal injury. 
 
Walker, 146 A.2d at 291. The unusual aspect of this case, 
then, is that the guardians themselves, who should have 
been protecting Elizabeth's interests, in fact caused the 
injury to her. Thus, her case differs from the more typical 
one where a third party injures a mentally incompetent 
person and the guardian fails to bring the claim in a timely 
fashion. In the latter case, tolling would be inappr opriate 
because the guardian had failed to exer cise diligence. We 
must reiterate, however, that this is not a case based on 
state law for breach of fiduciary trust to r emedy a ward's 
injury caused by a guardian. This is a federal civil rights 
case seeking a remedy to a member of a pr otected class 
who is prevented by state law fr om tolling the statute of 
limitations because her guardian failed to pr otect her 
precisely because she was mentally retar ded. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
S 1983 action would contradict federal policy by insulating those who 
had denied his rights. Eubanks, 434 F . Supp. at 1032-33. Similarly, 
while we recognize that Elizabeth's situation is not so extreme, it 
nonetheless presents similar concerns because the absence of a 
guardian who could advocate Elizabeth's rights made it practically 
impossible for her to protect her rights. Thus, failing to equitably toll 
the 
statute of limitations for Elizabeth would imper missibly allow the 
defendants to avoid responsibility for their actions simply through the 
passage of time. 
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Because of her mental incapacity, Elizabeth claims to 
have been unable to appreciate the injury that was done to 
her when she was sterilized. (We of course will remand to 
determine if that allegation is justified.) Apparently, she has 
not been lax in bringing suit because she could not 
recognize that there was cause to do so. In fact, she 
brought her suit within two years of lear ning from her 
gynecologist that she had been sterilized. Absent her 
request for a more searching physical examination, she 
would not necessarily have had a reason to suspect that 
she had been sterilized until a doctor so infor med her 
because the effects of a sterilization ar e not always 
physically observable.11 Thus, it would appear that she has 
acted diligently, at least on the facts she alleges. Permitting 
the tolling provisions of the state statute of limitations to 
bar her cause of action would frustrate the federal civil 
rights laws by barring a remedy to a pr otected person 
because the guardian, who under state law should have 
sought to vindicate that person, harmed her instead. 
 
In sum, we are not equitably tolling Pennsylvania's 
statute of limitations solely because Elizabeth's mental 
incompetence prevented her from recognizing her injury 
when she was sterilized. Instead, as in Eubanks , we are 
tolling it due to the failure of the guar dian system. The 
persons, who should have protected Elizabeth because of 
her retardation, instead harmed her by having her sterilized 
so that she could not procreate. If her allegations prove 
true on remand, Elizabeth's claims should pr oceed.12 In this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Tubal ligations do not necessarily af fect a woman's menstrual cycle 
or other aspects of her femininity. See L. Elizabeth Bowles, The 
Disenfranchisement of Fertile Women in Clinical Trials: The Legal 
Ramifications of and Solutions for Rectifying the Knowledge Gap, 45 
Vand. L. Rev. 877, 909 (1992) (discussing consequences of tubal 
ligation); Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427, 432 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) 
(approving tubal ligation because, among other reasons, it would not 
affect C.W.'s menstrual cycle or feelings of femininity). 
 
12. The defendants argue that Elizabeth had enough time after she left 
the custody of her father and stepmother to bring her case. We are not 
persuaded that, absent a guardian or other r epresentative of her 
interests, Elizabeth could be expected to advocate her own interests or 
even evaluate what course of action would be in her best interest. Thus, 
the fact that she left her parents' home does not, alone, preclude our 
application of federal tolling principles. 
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instance, equitable tolling would promote Congr ess's intent 
in enacting SS 1983 and 1985. It would give Elizabeth the 
opportunity she was denied when she was sterilized-- 
adequate representation of her inter ests -- and give her a 
chance to seek a remedy for her injury. 
 
We hold, therefore, that the Pennsylvania statute of 
limitations for personal injury claims could, on these 
alleged facts, be equitably tolled until the time, perhaps the 
gynecologist visit in December 1993, when Elizabeth and 
her husband Justin learned, or should have become aware, 
that Elizabeth's sterilization procedur e left her permanently 
unable to bear children.13 W e will remand this case to the 
District Court to determine whether equitable tolling is 
appropriate under the standard we set out above. 
 
IV. Loss of Consortium Claim 
 
The Lakes also argue that the lower court decision to 
dismiss Justin's consortium claim should be r eversed. We 
have plenary review over the District Court's dismissal of 
Justin Lake's consortium claim for failure to state a claim. 
See Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund, LP, 51 
F.3d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
The Magistrate Judge concluded that Justin's loss 
consortium claims were barred on substantive legal 
grounds because Elizabeth's injury occurr ed before the 
Lakes were married. See Sprague v. Kaplan , 572 A.2d 789 
(Pa. 1990) (holding that consortium claims ar e only valid 
when a spouse is injured after the couple is married). On 
appeal, the Lakes argue that their case is distinguishable 
from Sprague because Elizabeth's injury is akin to a 
spouse's injury that develops over time. Thus, the discovery 
rule should also preserve Justin's derivative loss of 
consortium claim. 
 
The Lakes argue that their claim falls within the scope of 
Vazquez v. Friedberg, 637 A.2d 300 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), 
which recognized that when the cause of action underlying 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Applying the equitable tolling doctrine to Elizabeth's federal claims, 
however, does not mean that we are making any decisions on the merits 
of her case. 
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a loss of consortium claim is tolled subject to the discovery 
rule, the statute of limitations for the loss of consortium 
claim is also tolled. See id. at 301-02. In Vazquez, although 
the injury that caused her husband's cancer occurr ed 
before their marriage, the court permitted the wife to assert 
a loss of consortium claim because the cancer that they 
discovered after their marriage, and not the initial injury, 
was the basis for her claim. See id. The Lakes assert that, 
because the harm Elizabeth suffers is her inability to have 
children, the loss of consortium claim is based on that 
injury rather than the initial sterilization. 
 
We disagree. Even though we are tolling the statute of 
limitations for Elizabeth's federal claims, Sprague still bars 
Justin's consortium claim on substantive grounds. Once 
Elizabeth was sterilized, she was unable to have children. 
There is no subsequent harm, as in V azquez, arising from 
that initial injury. Moreover, even under the more general 
proposition that the loss of consortium claim, like the 
underlying federal civil rights claims, should be equitably 
tolled, the Lakes' argument also fails. Elizabeth and Justin 
were both aware of Elizabeth's sterilization in 1993, before 
their marriage in 1994. Therefore, the injury was discovered 
before, not after, their marriage, a scenario under which 
Sprague precludes suit. 
 
V. Denial of Leave of Amend Complaint  
 
Our final inquiry is whether the District Court should 
have allowed the Lakes' motion to amend their complaint a 
second time following remand in Lake I. We review the 
District Court's decision to deny the Lakes' r equest to 
amend for abuse of discretion. See In r e Burlington Coat 
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(citing Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F .3d 1406, 1413-14 (3d Cir. 
1993)). 
 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedur e, a plaintiff is 
entitled to amend her claim once; courts may grant 
subsequent amendments "when justice so requires." Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 15(a). While this Rule also r equires that leave to 
amend should be "freely given," a district court has the 
discretion to deny this request if it is apparent from the 
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record that (1) the moving party has demonstrated undue 
delay, bad faith or dilatory motives, (2) the amendment 
would be futile, or (3) the amendment would pr ejudice the 
other party. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 
While a District Court has substantial leeway in deciding 
whether to grant leave to amend, when it refuses this type 
of request without justifying its decision, this action is "not 
an exercise of its discretion but an abuse of its discretion." 
Id. 
 
As the Lakes note, the District Court's October 1998 
order offered no explanation for denying their request, even 
though the Lakes filed their request for leave to amend on 
April 1, 1998. At that time, the Lakes alleged that they had 
additional facts that would enable them to withstand the 
defendants' motion to dismiss. As we learned at argument, 
however, the Lakes did not supply the District Court with 
a draft amended complaint, even though they had several 
months between the time that the Magistrate Judge issued 
his Report and Recommendation (filed March 10, 1998) and 
when the District Court issued its order (filed October 30, 
1998) during which to draft one. Instead, the Lakes chose 
to wait until the District Court issued its or der. 
 
Despite their delay, the Lakes now urge us to reverse the 
District Court's decision as an abuse of its discr etion 
because the District Court's order failed to explain why it 
denied their request to amend. Not providing a justification 
for a denial of leave to amend, however, does not 
automatically constitute an abuse of discretion as long as 
the court's rationale is readily apparent from the record on 
appeal. See 3 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal 
Practice S 15.14[2] at 15-32 (3d ed. 1999), citing Pallotino v. 
City of Rio Rancho, 31 F.3d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(noting that court failed to provide expr ess reason for denial 
but only harmless error when appar ent from record). 
 
Moreover, some District Court local rules in our Circuit 
require that a plaintiff give a District Court a draft amended 
complaint so that it can review the proposed changes to 
determine whether "justice requir es" the court to grant 
plaintiff's request. See Cindrich, et al., 1 Federal Civil 
Procedure Before Trial--3d Circuit 8:285 (1996) (discussing 
Local Rule 12(h) for District Court of New Jersey). 
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Obviously, without this draft complaint, the District Court 
cannot evaluate the merits of a plaintiffs' r equest. Here, as 
we stated above, the plaintiff failed to give the District 
Court a draft complaint to review. Thus, the court had 
nothing upon which to exercise its discr etion. 
Consequently, the District Court's lack of findings or 
justification do not make its denial of leave to amend 
improper, although such a statement would have made our 
review more straightforward. See Rolo v. City Investing Co. 
Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 655 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(upholding District Court's denial of leave to amend despite 
absence of specific factual findings justifying denial); Kelly 
v. Del. River Joint Comm'n, 187 F.2d 93, 95 (3d Cir. 1950) 
(affirming lower court's summary refusal to permit 
amendment to a claim given plaintiff's failur e to provide 
court with a proposed amended complaint). 
 
We conclude that the Lakes' failure to provide a draft 
amended complaint would be an adequate basis on which 
the court could deny the plaintiff's r equest. See Rolo, 155 
F.3d at 655; accord Harris v. City of Auburn, 27 F.3d 1284, 
1987 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the failur e to provide a 
proposed amended complaint demonstrates lack of 
diligence or bad faith). Moreover, we ar e inclined to give the 
District Court even broader discretion when, as here, the 
court has already granted the requesting party an 
opportunity to amend its complaint. See, e.g., DCD 





For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court's order dismissing Elizabeth's federal claims and we 
will remand the case to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. W e will affirm the 
dismissal of Elizabeth's state personal injury claims, as well 
as Justin's loss of consortium claim. Finally, we will affirm 
the District Court's decision to deny the Lakes' r equest to 
amend their complaint. 
 
                                21 
  
SLOVITER, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with the majority that Elizabeth Lake's state law 
claims are time-barred under the two-year statute of 
limitations in effect at the relevant time and that, under 
Pennsylvania law in effect at that time, the statute of 
limitations did not toll for either minority or incompetence. 
I also agree with Judge Roth's analysis concluding that 
Elizabeth's mental retardation does not pr ovide a basis for 
preserving her claim under Pennsylvania's tolling statute 
and that, while it may appear harsh, the state discovery 
rule does not afford any relief fr om this conclusion.1 
Therefore, I join the judgment enter ed by the majority in 
those respects. 
 
However, it is precisely because I agr ee with the 
majority's application of Pennsylvania's statute of 
limitations as barring Elizabeth Lake's Pennsylvania tort 
claim that I respectfully disagree with the majority's 
decision not to apply the then-applicable Pennsylvania 
tolling rules to bar Lake's federal claim filed under 42 
U.S.C. SS 1983 and 1985(3). I believe that the Supreme 
Court's decisions in Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 161 (1985), 
and Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536 (1989), dictate 
otherwise. 
 
In Wilson, the Court undertook to r esolve the varying 
interpretations by the federal courts of appeals regarding 
the appropriate state statute of limitations to be applied to 
civil rights actions, a conflict created because the Civil 
Rights Act does not include a specific statute of limitations 
governing actions brought under #8E8E # 1983 and 1985. The 
Court noted that because no suitable federal rule exists, 
S 1988 instructs that federal courts should select "the most 
appropriate" or "the most analogous" state statute of 
limitations to apply to the S 1983 claim as long as it is not 
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United 
States. However, because of the numer ous and diverse 
topics and subtopics encompassed within the constitutional 
claims alleged under S 1983, "[a]lmost every S 1983 claim 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. I also agree with the majority's affir mance of the dismissal of Justin 
Lake's loss of consortium claim and the District Court's decision to deny 
the Lakes' request to amend their complaint. 
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can be favorably analogized to more than one of the ancient 
common-law forms of action, each of which may be 
governed by a different statute of limitations." Wilson, 471 
U.S. at 272-73. The Court opined that Congress would not 
have sanctioned an interpretation of the statute that would 
lead to applying different statutes of limitations to the 
various S 1983 claims arising in the same state. After 
considering the issue, the Court adopted the 
"characterization of all S 1983 actions as involving claims 
for personal injuries." Id. at 279. 
 
The Court selected one statute of limitations to be applied 
for this purpose in order to minimize, if not eliminate, "the 
conflict, confusion, and uncertainty concer ning the 
appropriate statute of limitations to apply to this most 
important, and ubiquitous, civil rights statute." Id. at 266. 
Thereafter, in Hardin, the Court held that a federal court 
applying a state statute of limitations should give effect as 
well to the state's provision for tolling that statute of 
limitations. 490 U.S. at 539. The Court repeated its earlier 
statement in Wilson, 471 U.S. at 269 n.17, that "[i]n 
virtually all statutes of limitations the chr onological length 
of the limitation period is interrelated with provisions 
regarding tolling, revival, and questions of application." 
(quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 
454, 464 (1975) (emphasis added)). 
 
I am concerned that the holding of the majority would 
detract from the very certainty the Court sought in Wilson. 
Thus, under Wilson and Hardin , to determine the statute of 
limitations, one need only examine the applicable state's 
personal injuries statute of limitations and deter mine 
whether that state would permit tolling under those 
circumstances. Under the majority's rule, even though the 
state would not have permitted tolling under its statute of 
limitations, tolling may be permitted in aS 1983 suit if, in 
the court's view, tolling would comport with the underlying 
purposes of the civil rights statute. Not only is this 
inconsistent with the important goals of unifor mity and 
certainty in application of the statute of limitations 
established by the Supreme Court but it is also 
inconsistent with the Court's reliance on the state to 
determine whether and when tolling should be permitted. 
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See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 464 ("In borr owing a state period 
of limitation for application to a federal cause of action, a 
federal court is relying on the State's wisdom in setting a 
limit, and exceptions thereto, on the pr osecution of a 
closely analogous claim."). 
 
In Wilson, the Court reasoned that tort actions constitute 
a major part of the volume of civil litigation in the state 
courts, and concluded that: "It is most unlikely that the 
period of limitations applicable to such claims ever was, or 
ever would be, fixed in a way that would discriminate 
against federal claims, or be inconsistent with federal law in 
any respect." 471 U.S. at 279. Accor dingly, application of 
the state's personal injuries statute of limitations 
"minimizes the risk that the choice of a state statute of 
limitations would not fairly serve the federal inter ests 
vindicated by S 1983." Id. Pennsylvania ultimately did allow 
tolling for mental disability; however, the majority would 
allow tolling a federal civil rights action whenever the 
federal court, not the state, determines that tolling should 
be applied. 
 
The effect of the majority's holding is to open the 
possibility of damage actions under the Civil Rights Act 
against individuals more than 23 years after the event at 
issue. This is again inconsistent with the W ilson Court's 
expressed concern with allowing a federal cause of action to 
be "brought at any distance of time," noting that "[j]ust 
determinations of fact cannot be made when, because of 
the passage of time, the memories of witnesses have faded 
or evidence is lost." Id. at 271 (quotation omitted). 
 
Although I appreciate the empathy for Lake that 
underlies this portion of the majority's decision, for the 
reasons set forth I feel compelled to dissent. 
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